

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 COLOMB 01320 131311Z

50 40

ACTION PM-07

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-25 EA-11 NEA-14 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00

DODE-00 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01

PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19 OMB-01 AEC-11

DRC-01 SAJ-01 /182 W

----- 130282

R 131220Z MAY 74

FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0991

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY DACCA

AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KABUL

AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS

AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

AMEMBASSY RANGOON

AMEMBASSY SANAA

AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 COLOMB 01320 131311Z

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USLO PEKING
USMISSION BRUSSELS
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN
AMCONSUL BOMBAY
AMCONSUL CALCUTTA
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMCONSUL MADRAS
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L COLOMBO 1320

E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS: PFOR, US, XO, CE
SUBJ: US POLICY TOWARD THE INDIAN OCEAN

REF: DELHI 5616

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. AMB MOYNIHAN HAS PRESENTED THOUGHTFUL PROPOSALS RE INDIAN OCEAN, INCLUDING NEED FOR AUTHORITATIVE PUBLIC STATEMENT, BUT OUR FIRST PRIORITY SHOULD BE TO DEFINE US INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN AREA AND FRAME POLICIES IN PURSUIT OF THOSE INTERESTS. BEFORE WE CONSIDER ENGAGING IN CONSULTATIONS ON INDIAN OCEAN RESTRAINTS, WE SHOULD HAVE CLEAR IDEA OF WHERE WE WANT TO COME OUT BECUASE, OTHERWISE, WE WILL LOSE FLEXIBILITY WE NOW POSSESS. GOVT-WIDE AGREEMENT ON US POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS WILL NOT BE EASY, BUT WE SHOULD TRY TO REACH SUCH AGREEMENT RAPIDLY, INCLUDING WHETHER OR NOT OUR INTERESTS WILL BE SERVED BY LIMITATIONS OR RESTRAINTS OR BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL CONSULTATIONS. IN SHORT, WE NEED FIRST TO COMPLETE OUR HOMEWORK IN WASHINGTON. END SUMMARY.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 COLOMB 01320 131311Z

2. SRI LANKA IS UNQUESTIONABLY THE CENTER-PIECE OF INDIAN OCEAN AND PRIME MINISTER BANDARANAIKE THE UNDISPUTED MOTHER OF INDIAN OCEAN ZONE OF PEACE IDEA. BECAUSE OF THIS EMBASSY SOBVIOUS PRIDE OF PLACE, I AM SURE OTHER OUTPOSTS OF INDIAN OCEAN DIPLOMACY HAVE BEEN WONDERING WHERE OUR COMMENTS ON

AMB MOYNIHAN'S THOUGHTFUL PROPOSAL
WERE. HERE THEY ARE:

3. AMB MOYNIHAN HAS RECOMMENDED THREE THINGS: A) A MAJOR US PUBLIC STATEMENT AFFIRMING OUR OBJECTIVE OF PEACEFUL INDIAN OCEAN, INCLUDING EXPRESSION OF OUR DESIRE TO AVOID MAJOR POWER MILITARY COMPETITION; B) AFFIRMATION OF BASIC CRITERIA FOR ANY INDIAN OCEAN RESTRAINTS, LIMITATIONS OR ZONES WHICH WOULD PROTECT US INTERESTS; AND C) ACTIVE US CONSULTATION WITH RELEVANT COUNTRIES ON ISSUE OF INDIAN OCEAN RESTRAINTS.

4. IN PRINCIPLE, I HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH THESE THREE PROPOSALS. I DO FORESEE DIFFICULTIES IF IT IS SUGGESTED THAT WE EMBARK ON THESE COURSES OF ACTION AT SAME TIME. THE WEIGHT OF THIS MESSAGE IS THAT OUR FIRST PRIORITY SHOULD BE TO DEFINE US INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN INDIAN OCEAN AND TO FRAME POLICIES IN PURSUIT THOSE INTERESTS. ONLY THEN CAN WE CONFIDENTLY DECIDE WHETHER MAJOR AUTHORITATIVE PUBLIC DECLARATION BASED ON AGREED POLICY WILL SIGNIFICANTLY ADVANCE OUR INTERESTS AND WHETHER WE SHOULD ENTER INTO BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON INDIAN OCEAN RESTRAINTS.

5. IN THE NEAR TERM, SOME TYPE OF LESS AMBITIOUS PUBLIC STATEMENT MIGHT BE OF VALUE TO CERTAIN POSTS, SUCH AS NEW DELHI, WHERE NOV 1973 BREZHNEV-GANDHI JOINT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 COLOMB 01320 131311Z

DECLARATION APPARENTLY PLACES US AT PROPAGANDA DISADVANTAGE. IF SO, TASK OF PREPARING SUCH STATEMENT SHOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT. WE ALREADY HAVE MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS FROM MESSRS ZURHELLEN, WEISS, NOYES, AND ADMIRAL ZUMWALT, AND AN ACCOMPLISHED DRAFTING OFFICER COULD EXTRACT RELEVANT PORTIONS OF THEIR TESTIMONY AND PUT TOGETHER STATEMENT WHICH MIGHT HAVE SOME PUBLIC RELATIONS AND PROPAGANDA VALUE.

6. WHETHER SUCH STATEMENT WOULD BE PERSUASIVE TO GOVTS AND POLITICAL LEADERS IS ANOTHER THING. FROM COLOMBO PERSPECTIVE, IT MIGHT BE marginally HELPFUL, ALTHOUGH

CEYLONENE ARE PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN SUBSTANCE OF OUR POLICY AS IT AFFECTS THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS RATHER THAN IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS. CEYLONENE THEMSELVES ARE AMBIVALENT. THEY HAVE CONTINUED TO PROMOTE INDIAN OCEAN ZONE OF PEACE PROPOSAL BUT HAVE REACTED WITH REMARKABLE RESTRAINT TO OUR DECISIONS TO ENHANCE US NAVAL PRESENCE AND EXPAND DIEGO GARCIA. WE WOULD LIKE TO THINK THIS RESTRAINT IS RESULT OF SKILLFUL AMERICAN DIPLOMACY. MORE ACCURATE EXPLANATION IS THAT CEYLONENE PERCEIVE THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS IN INDIAN OCEAN WITHIN TWO INTER-RELATED FRAMEWORKS: FIRST IN INTER-ACTION BETWEEN THREE MAJOR EXTERNAL POWERS (US, USSR AND PRC) AND, SECOND, IN TERMS OF POWER EQUATION WITHIN SOUTH ASIA.

7. IDEALLY, CEYLONENE WOULD PREFER TO EXCLUDE ALL FOREIGN NAVAL PRESENCE FROM THE INDIAN OCEAN AND TO SEE INDIAN NAVY MAINTAINED AT LOW LEVEL. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF EXISTING SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE AND LINGERING CEYLONENE CONCERNS ABOUT WHAT THEY STILL PERCEIVE TO BE SOVIET-INDIAN LINKUP, SOME CEYLONENE SEE AMERICAN PRESENCE AS USEFUL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 COLOMB 01320 131311Z

COUNTER FORCE. (THIS HELPS EXPLAIN WHY, ALTHOUGH INDIANS WRE BADLY SHAKEN BY DEPLOYMENT OF CARRIER ENTERPRISE IN 1971, CEYLONENE ISSUED FLEETING INVITATION TO ENTERPRISE TO VISIT COLOMBO.) CEYLONENE POSTURE IS ALSO SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUENCED BY BELIEF CHINESE TOO SEE US PRESENCE AS A COUNTER TO SOVIETS AND BY MUTED POSITION ON DIEGO GARCIA ADOPTED BY PAKISTAN. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WHILE STATEMENT OF EXISTING US POLICY AND PEACEFUL INTENT MIGHT HAVE LIMITED VALUE IN CUSHIONING ADVERSE CEYLONENE PUBLIC REACTION TO DIEGO GARCIA, IT WOULD NOT AFFECT GSL LEADERS PRIVATE CALCULATION OF THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS.

8. IN TERMS OUR OWN SECURITY INTERESTS IT SEEMS TO ME WE WILL EMBARK ON HAZARDOUS COURSE IF WE TRY TO INJECT OURSELVES INTO ONGOING CONSULTATION ON INDIAN OCEAN RESTRAINTS AT UNITED NATIONS AND ELSEWHERE UNTIL WE HAVE CLEAR PERCEPTION OF OUR INTERESTS AND

OBJECTIVES AND KNOW WHERE WE WANT TO COME OUT. OTHERWISE, SUCH CONSULTATIONS WILL LIMIT FLEXIBILITY WE NOW POSSESS AND RISK PLACING US IN RELATIVELY ISOLATED POSITION IN AD HOC COMMITTEE FOR CREATE PRESSURES ON US TO MODIFY OUR POSITIONS BEFORE WE HAVE DECIDED WHERE OUR INTERESTS LIE.

9. I AM NOT SUGGESTING IT WILL BE AN EASY TASK TO REACH AGREEMENT ON US POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS WHICH WOULD MEET EMBASSY NEW DELHI'S NEED FOR LONG-RANGE RATIONALE REGARDING MILITARY PRESENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN. WE HAVE ALREADY SPENT THREE OR FOUR YEARS AND COUNTLESS THOUSANDS OF MAN HOURS ATTEMPTING TO FORMULATE A GOVERNMENT-WIDE POLICY TOWARD INDIAN OCEAN, ONLY TO HAVE MUCH OF THIS WORK OVERCONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 COLOMB 01320 131311Z

TAKEN BY HIGH-LEVEL DECISIONS LAST FALL, WHICH INDICATED PREVIOUS FORMULATIONS DID NOT MEET REQUIREMENTS STEMMING FROM MIDDLE EAST WAR.

10. THIS WILL NOT BE FIRST TIME WE HAVE BEEN REQUIRED ON EX POSTO FACTO BASIS TO DEVELOP POLICY RATIONALE FOR PRIOR POLITICO-MILITARY DECISIONS. BUT IS IS IMPORTANT TO COMPLETE NEW POLICY STUDY, HOPEFULLY BEFORE REOPENING OF SUEZ CANAL, AND DECIDE INTER ALIA: A) WHAT DO ME MEAN WHEN WE SAY WE WANT TO AVOID MAJOR POWER MILITARY COMPETITION IN THE AREA? B) ARE WE WILLING TO ACCEPT ANY RESTRAINTS OR LIMITATIONS ON OUR ACTIVITIES? C) IF SO, WILL OUR INTERESTS BE SERVED BY FIRST DISCUSSING MUTUAL RESTRAINTS WITH THE SOVIETS? (I ASSUME WE HAVE NOT DONE SO TO DATE.), AND D) SHOULD WE ALSO DISCUSS SUCH RESTRAINTS IN BROADER MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK?

11. IF WE CONCLUDE THAT OUR OVER-ALL INTERESTS DICTATE THAT WE REMAIN ON PRESENT COURSE, SO BE IT. PRESUMABLY, THIS WOULD MEAN WE WOULD CONTINUE OUR ENHANCED NAVAL PRESENCE, PROCEED WITH EXPANSION OF DIEGO (BRITISH AND CONGRESS WILLING), ESCHEW LIMITATIONS AND RESTRAINTS, AVOID CONSULTA-

TIONS TO MAXIMIZE OUR FLEXIBILTY, AND
CONTINUE TO TAKE SOME HEAT FROM MOST LITTORAL
STATES. ON OTHER HAND, IF AFTER CAREFUL
STUDY, WE DECIDED OUR INTERESTS COULD BE
SERVED BY NEGOTIATED LIMITATIONS OR RESTRAINTS
OR ZONAL ARRANGEMENTS, WE WILL THEN BE ABLE
TO DETERMINE HOW BEST TO PURSE THSE OBJECT-
IVES, EITHER BILATERALLY OR WITHIN MULTI-
LATERAL FRAMEWORK, AND WE WILL BE IN BETTER
POSITION TO ISSUE TYPE OF PUBLIC DECLARA-
TION OF PEACEFUL INTENT W
E E E E E E E

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, PUBLIC ATTITUDES, MILITARY BASES, DIEGO GARCIA
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 13 MAY 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974COLOMB01320
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740116-0953
From: COLOMBO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740554/aaaabvoo.tel
Line Count: 282
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION PM
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: DELHI 5616
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags: ANOMALY
Review Date: 02 APR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <02 APR 2002 by boyleja>; APPROVED <12 JUN 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: US POLICY TOWARD THE INDIAN OCEAN
TAGS: PFOR, US, XO, CE
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005